The 2005 Riots in France: The International Impact of Domestic Violence by Koff, Harlan & Duprez, Dominique
The 2005 Riots in France: The
International Impact of
Domestic Violence
Harlan Koff and Dominique Duprez
Following the Autumn 2005 riots in France, many observers in both the popular and the
academic press argued that the urban violence that occurred over a two-week period was
an open challenge to the French Republican model of citizenship, which does not
recognise racial, ethnic or religious affiliations. Many experts focused their analyses of the
riots on the relationship between discrimination and ethnic mobilisation in disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods. Often, the discussions surrounding the uprisings were embedded
in the ongoing debate between liberal and communitarian notions of citizenship and the
lack of ethnic recognition in France. The articles in this special issue of JEMS indicate
another interpretation of the events of OctoberNovember 2005. According to much of
the comparative analysis presented in this collection, the riots were not a challenge to the
French Republic but a demonstration of its schizophrenic characteristics.
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Introduction
Zied Benna, a 15-year-old of Tunisian origin, and Bouna Traore´, a 17-year-old of
Malian background, both the sons of dustmen in Paris, were killed accidentally on 27
October 2005. Believing themselves to have been followed by the police on their
return from a football match, they hid in an EDF (French electricity company)
transformer and were electrocuted. Their deaths provoked riots in Clichy-sous-Bois
where the tragedy occurred. This violence spread quickly throughout many poor
suburbs of Paris. Over the following three weeks it spread to neighbourhoods
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classified as ZUS*Zones Urbaines Sensibles or ‘sensitive urban zones’*in the 200
main cities of France.
Thus, in October 2005, France began to burn. Throughout the world, television
stations and newspapers showed sensational images of French cities ‘in flames’.
Immediately, French officials began spreading their message that the violence was
being exaggerated. Ex-Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin even refuted the use
of the term ‘riot’ in an interview with CNN, suggesting that the events that his
country was experiencing were merely a form of ‘disorder’. While debates arose
concerning the proper label for the uprising, there was common recognition that
the damage to French cities was significant. The damage included the burning of
10,000 private vehicles, 30,000 rubbish bins, hundreds of public buildings, buses
and post-office vehicles (see Mucchielli in this special issue). The total cost of the
urban violence amounted to over 200 million euros. Despite the fact that there were
no deaths directly caused by the uprisings, the material damage was so great that
many observers called this violence the most significant protest in France since the
events of May 1968.
These views were openly discussed by academics, politicians and representatives of
non-governmental organisations during a conference on the riots*from which the
papers in this special issue derive*sponsored by the Centre Lillois d’Etudes
Sociologiques et E´conomiques (Clerse´), at the University of Lille 1, in January
2006. The articles contend that debates on the riots cannot be limited to studies of the
position of ethnic minorities in France. Instead, the 2005 violence has highlighted the
need to discuss the state of republican democracy in France. French policies towards
migrants and minorities highlight many of the structural questions that have led to
numerous instances of conflict over the last three years, including the 2006 students’
strikes, the 2007 riots in Parisian suburbs (see below), and national mass transit
strikes which took place in the same year. Thus, social conflict indicates endemic
problems associated with the quality of French democracy.
In fact, during the January conference, Jean-Pierre Balduyck, mayor of the
northern French city of Tourcoing, stated: ‘I fear for democracy in France’. Mayor
Balduyck based his bold statement more on the public and governmental responses to
the Autumn 2005 uprisings than on the actual riots themselves. The legacy of the riots
may be less related to the actual rebellion by youth in poor urban neighburhoods and
more closely connected with French political responses*or the lack thereof*to the
urban disorder.
Scholars of French politics have often observed that the more things change, the
more they stay the same (plus c¸a change, plus c’est la meˆme chose). The 1968 student
uprisings somehow challenged this notion. These protests led to the downfall of
President de Gaulle, challenged his form of authoritarian leadership, and opened
access to traditional political channels (Macridis 1975). These movements were so
significant in French politics that they were still remembered and cited in 2005 when
the Autumn riots occurred. Conversely, the violent urban disorder that touched
virtually every French city in 2005 quickly dissipated from France’s collective memory
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just weeks after it was suppressed by French police. In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, the
man whose words instigated the spread of the urban violence, was elected President of
France, in part due to promises to guarantee urban security and halt immigration.
Thus, the impact of the riots seems to be reduced as structural factors in French
politics have not changed and have, in fact, been reinforced by the events of 2005. For
example, in 2007, President Sarkozy’s newest integration laws established a ‘Welcome
and Integration Contract’ for immigrants which obliges migrants to uphold the ‘laws
and values’ of France and take civics and language courses. Furthermore, the
November 2007 riots which occurred following the death of two youths in the
northern Paris suburb of Villiers-le-Bel (their motorbike was hit by a police car whose
occupants subsequently fled the scene) barely raised national debates about
integration policies and the structural traits of contemporary French democracy,
even though these events received significant attention in the international press.
Some even considered this violence to be more significant than that which occurred
in 2005, because riot police faced organised gangs who were well-armed with
shotguns and petrol bombs (more than 80 police were hospitalised, even though the
riots were quite localised geographically). Developments in French integration
politics in 2007 make one wonder whether the right questions were asked during
the analyses of the 2005 French urban riots. Integration was discussed at length.
However, as stated earlier, the quality of French democracy should have been the
central focus of these discussions; it forms the focus of the following sections.
The Urban Riots of 2005 Revisited
More than three years have passed since France’s banlieues exploded. In the months
following the violence, numerous academic debates were organised to discuss what
happened, why it happened and what the significance of it might be. Authors
participating in one of these discussions1 rightfully identified the geographic (Paul A.
Silverstein and Chantal Tetreault), social (Riva Kastoyano) and economic (Ezra
Suleiman) exclusion that led to the riots. Most of them also addressed cultural
questions regarding identity and the place of migrants in the French state (Jocelyne
Cesari). What generally seemed lacking in the analysis of the 2005 violence was
context. Work published by the aforementioned scholars in this debate examined the
violence itself and its place in French immigration or citizenship politics. However, as
the next sub-section demonstrates, broader discussions of French democracy were
thinner and there was a lack of comparative analysis with other countries. Thus the
riots*and integration politics in France*were placed under a microscope and
readily dissected, but rarely were they viewed in a broader context. This comparative
view is important given the prominence that French integration policies have
obtained in the European Union. Many states, such as the Netherlands and Denmark,
have openly moved towards assimilationist policies. Also, in July 2008, President
Sarkozy made immigration reform one of his highest priorities for France’s 2008
Presidency of the EU. Comparative views on the 2005 riots provide an opportunity to
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better understand what occurred in France, but also to imagine what dangers could
await other states interested in adopting French immigration and integration
strategies.
The 2005 Riots: A Brief Review of the Literature
The literature on the urban riots of 2005 was particularly important in France. Even
though analyses were conducted fairly quickly in order to reply to these events in a
timely manner, one can to draw several central themes from them. One thesis
summarised by Ge´rard Mauger considered these riots to be ‘proto-political’
movements. ‘From the standpoints of their inception and their initial motives, as
well as from the standpoints of social identity and the practices of the rioters’, these
social movements are in line with the repertory of traditional infra-political collective
action (Mauger 2007: 148). Like many, Mauger wonders if one can identify in these
events the beginnings of a revolt of French suburban youth who have become more
conscious of themselves as actors. Unfortunately, he does not provide a convincing
response to this question which would support this proposed thesis. Similarly, Bruno
Julliard, the leader of the students’ union UNEF, which obtained the repeal of the
Contrat Premie`re Embauche (CPE)2 after several weeks of strikes and fights with the
police in Spring 2006, declared to Libe´ration on 1 December 2007 that his main regret
was ‘not to have succeeded in comparing the problems of suburban youth to those of
students’.
The majority of researchers studying the 2005 riots have agreed that they should
not be considered as a social movement carrying a political message. For example,
Robert Castel underlines ‘the interpretation grid proposed to understand the
behaviour of these youths: that is, that they are trapped in a contradiction and
that their blind violence is a nihilist response to the dead end in which they find
themselves. They are not at all ‘‘excluded’’ . . . but they experience their prerogatives
through the impossibility of their concrete achievement. They are citizens without the
positive attributes of citizenship and they negatively test their membership of the
French nation through their non-achievement and unfulfilled promises’ (Castel 2006:
783). He adds that ‘the attention exclusively placed on crime amongst these youth,
making them play the role of the dangerous class, reinforces stigmatisations which
they already suffer in different domains of social life. The logic that is put in place in
the name of the republican order risks to transform itself into a logic of ghettoisation,
as these youths have no other recourse but to close themselves in their own
community and change their stigmas by claiming racial pride against the deceptive
promises of democracy’ (Castel 2006: 808).
Other scholars have defended French citizenship policies. Facing numerous theses
that underline the failure of the French integration model, Schnapper (2006)
contends that, as far as the acculturation of the descendants of migrants is concerned,
more is accomplished in France than in other European countries. She deduces
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therefore that the ‘republican model’ is not obsolete in principle, but only in its
application methods.
Finally, Beaud and Tree Masclet (2006) have identified the ‘housing projects (cite´s)
generation’ which has been deprived of the tools for political struggle and collective
defence, so much so that the most underprivileged faction of the group has often
been reduced to acting only through the logic of provocation and, in the end, in order
to be heard, to expressing itself through riot and violence. Therefore, studying this
generation sociologically offers the means to comparatively understand the objective
and subjective difficulties that it encounters in order to construct itself as a collective
actor. This is one objective of this special issue, which adds an important
international dimension to this debate.
The International Impact of Domestic Riots
Instead of using the urban violence of 2005 to promote the reform of the French
Republican model of government, French leaders and citizens have distanced
themselves from the discontent that led to the riots (see Koff, this issue). Unlike
1968, when a national social movement for political rights was embraced by a broader
spectrum of citizens who recognised this call for improved access to French
citizenship as just, the 2005 urban riots were dismissed as a simple response to
discrimination and political provocation. Newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy
openly stated that France’s integration strategies ‘have failed’ and has introduced
‘obligatory integration contracts’ for migrants that heavily focus on assimilation,
including language and culture requirements for long-term (ten-year) resident
permits.
As in 1968, participants in the 2005 riots were not challenging the Republic but
were seeking access to Republican citizenship (see Duprez in this issue). For this
reason, it is not sufficient to discuss the riots within the framework of French
immigration politics. These events must be grounded in debates concerning the
present state and future of French citizenship and democracy. Moreover, because
these events occurred in France*seen by many foreign viewers as a positive model
for immigrant integration*discussions of French Republican citizenship and
democracy have international ramifications, even though the impact of the riots
seems to have only marginally affected debates concerning citizenship and democracy
in France. Many states, such as the Netherlands (see Entzinger, this issue), had
expressed widespread interest in importing French republicanism; now, the 2005 riots
seem to have made European leaders think twice about the utility of this model.
Hence, the comparative dimension of this special issue not only sheds light on the
riots by introducing an international perspective, but it also addresses the impact of
the 2005 violence on European integration agendas. The riots certainly weakened
Sarkozy’s bargaining position at the July 2007 meeting of the EU Council in which he
attempted to convince EU leaders of the utility of implementing European
integration contracts based on the French example discussed above (Sarkozy was
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only able to negotiate an agreement that the EU would promote European values
such as the respect of equality between men and women). This discussion is almost as
important as the riots themselves.
This special issue comprises five articles which analyse different dimensions of the
2005 French urban violence. First, Mucchielli provides first-hand accounts of the
OctoberNovember riots*collected from interviews with participants and grounded
in discussions of French urban policies enacted over the last 25 years*and an
explanation of their social geography. Duprez then provides a sociological analysis of
the causes of the riots through the historical examination of three institutional
factors: 1) the decline of the French welfare state; 2) the impact of centralisation on
citizenpolity relationships in poor urban neighbourhoods; and 3) the impact of
political bipartisanism on French urban policies.
In addition, this issue includes three comparative pieces. The first, by Harlan Koff,
examines the contagiousness of the French riots and explains this phenomenon
through a structural analysis of power and ethnicity in France and the United States.
The next, by Dietmar Loch, studies social exclusion, power and ethnic identity in
Germany and France. Loch specifically focuses on the impact of intermediary
political structures as mechanisms that facilitate ethnic mobilisation within the
framework of German party politics. He correctly notes that France lacks these
structures. Finally, Han Entzinger’s contribution examines the impact of the 2005
French riots on contemporary citizenship debates in the Netherlands. He demon-
strates how the 2005 violence has had an impact on the Netherlands due to that
country’s recent adoption of restrictive assimilation policies. These articles all discuss
the nature of democracy in immigrant societies and address the international impact
of the French riots on various citizenship debates. These broader approaches are
significant due to recent victories of right-wing parties throughout Europe and rising
tension between ethnic minorities and government authorities in various states. For
example, while ethnic rioting is traditionally associated with Great Britain and
France, 2007 also marked the first ethnic riots in Italy, as about one hundred Chinese
vendors attacked riot police on 13 April, following an incident between one of the
vendors and local traffic police in Milan. From just one day of violence, around 25
people were sent to hospital. While the scale of the violence is reduced compared to
that which occurred in France, it is significant because this was Italy’s first ‘immigrant
riot’. Moreover, it is important to note that the present government of Silvio
Berlusconi, like that of Nicolas Sarkozy, has responded to urban violence with more
restrictive immigration and citizenship policies and populist statements which have
further increased ethnic tensions. Both these leaders have placed responsibility for
integration on migrants and minorities themselves. In France, Sarkozy spearheaded
two immigration laws (1 January 2007) which cracked down on clandestine
migration, reduced possibilities for amnesty for unauthorised migrants residing on
French territory for more than ten years, and made citizenship through marriage
more difficult to obtain, in addition to the establishment of the integration contracts
mentioned above. Moreover, he called the November 2007 riots ‘assassination
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attempts on police’, which reinforced his negative relationship with the banlieues.
Similarly, Berlusconi’s new government has instituted populist policies which have
highlighted a national fight against clandestine migration and led to heavy-handed
police controls in migrant and Gypsy communities. These policies demonstrate the
fact that integration strategies need to be discussed within the framework of power,
legitimacy and, above all, leadership. This is the subject of the following section.
Legitimacy and Power in Urban France: Conflicting Leadership
Throughout the two weeks of rioting, Nicolas Sarkozy was the unquestionable centre
of media attention. By calling the rioters ‘trash’ (racailles), Sarkozy fuelled the
escalation of the violence from localised conflict to a national outburst of rage.
Journalists covering the riots documented a common anger amongst the participants
throughout France and Sarkozy became the political face against which the rioters
were reacting. Similarly, Sarkozy’s supporters rallied around his tough stance on
urban crime and immigration and this position helped him win the French
presidency in 2007.
Much has been written about Sarkozy’s role in the escalation of the 2005 riots in
both the popular and the academic press. Experts such as Olivier Roy and Bernard
Salanie´3 have contended that Sarkozy’s actions in 2005 and his present policies
indicate a crisis of political leadership in France. They argue that France’s political
elites remain out of touch with the youth who live in poor neighbourhoods. Of
course, this aspect of the political crisis clearly reflects a deficiency in French
leadership because of the net separation between leaders and followers (MacGregor
Burns 1978).
This vision of French politics correctly recognises the importance of the
detachment between French political elites at the national level and residents of the
banlieues, where the 2005 uprisings took place. This aspect of the violence indicates a
severe problem in the democratic realm of representation which has characterised the
French political system in recent years (Knapp 2004). However, the overall crisis of
leadership in French integration politics also includes an aspect that is more closely
tied to the sphere of governance, defined as the management of conflict in democratic
states. The 2005 riots plainly exposed the division of French political elites into
different classes. On the one hand, national politicians such as Sarkozy and de
Villepin were making strong public pronouncements on immigration, integration
and crime that reflected their focus on control and the suppression of the violence.
Conversely, local leaders were quietly attempting to calm rioters and create dialogue.
Thus, France’s national leaders are not only detached from their followers, but they
also demonstrate little communication with other leaders in the political system. For
example, following the November 2007 riots that began in Villiers-le-Bel, Franc¸ois
Pupponi*mayor of neighbouring Sarcelles, one of the suburbs that was struck by
violence*clearly stated ‘We have heard promise after promise, but nothing has been
done in the suburbs since the last [2005] riots, nothing’ (Sciolino 2007). Similarly,
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Fadela Amara, a junior minister in the present French government responsible for
integration strategies and urban policy has stated, ‘Real political will was greatly
lacking. There was no follow-up, no assessment. No one really knew who governed
urban policy’ (McNicoll 2008).
The riots showed that, more than 25 years after France began decentralising its
government, local authorities remain a political class in need of a definition. Much of
the media’s focus was placed on the political divide between the centre-right and the
centre-left in their integration strategies. Instead, the true problem in French politics
was largely overlooked. The net division between national and local responses to the
uprisings is a central element of the leadership crisis in France because it is structural.
Local and national officials often follow strategies that conflict, as shown below.
Like most of France’s major urban areas (with the notable exception of Marseilles),
the Lille me´tropole was significantly touched by the riots. Local reporters interviewed
rioters in the Lille-Sud neighbourhood and typically discussed the tensions with the
police, the comments made by Sarkozy and the discrimination that exists in France.
While national authorities reinforced the police presence in the neighbourhood and
enacted the national curfew instituted by de Villepin, the staff of Mayor Martine
Aubry were attempting to quietly mediate with the rioters. Articles in the local
newspaper, La Voix du Nord, documented the administration’s public meetings with
associations and residents in the neighbourhood.
Hence, the problem exposed by the riots was not limited to a lack of understanding
on the part of national officials; it also entailed a lack of communication between
local and national authorities. How could concertation, the path chosen by local
actors, work when national authorities were escalating tensions through policies
aimed at control? This was not a case of ‘big stick diplomacy’, where force was utilised
to create dialogue. National authorities showed no interest in communication with
associations or residents during the days of the riots. This undermined the actions of
local officials throughout the country and de-legitimised their efforts to mediate an
end to the uprising. Hence, not only have national authorities lost legitimacy in the
French banlieues, they have also damaged the credibility of local officials in these
neighbourhoods as well. This has created a serious leadership crisis that is systemic
and much more serious than the indelicate words of Nicolas Sarkozy, which have
been the main focus of leadership issues related to the 2005 riots.
In fact, since September 2007 Fadela Amara has been holding town-hall meetings
throughout France with the objective of creating a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the country’s
suburban neighbourhoods (Sarkozy himself did not visit these neighbourhoods
during the 2007 election campaign due to his unpopularity in these areas) and
improving relationships with local officials. These meetings have been met with great
scepticism by many local authorities, who must contend with social marginalisation
and security-related issues on a daily basis. Many have lost faith in the promises of
national authorities, including those of Sarkozy and Amara. While the aforemen-
tioned ‘Marshall Plan for the banlieues’ aims to create more than 100,000 jobs, better
transportation and improved schooling*including the potential for the forced social
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integration of French schools like that which has been typically tied to US integration
policies*critics argue that government officials have announced few concrete details
concerning the plan’s implementation. For example, in response to questions
concerning the plan’s budget, Minister Amara stated: ‘I refuse to have the plan
itemised. Why? We can’t give a euro figure because each minister will be putting the
plans in place, which is new. So we’ll actually surpass the billion euros people
imagined. When [Sarkozy] as candidate, even as president, said ‘‘Marshall Plan for
the banlieues’’, it wasn’t in terms of money. It was in terms of mobilization and
political will’ (McNicoll 2008). Obviously, such answers make local officials nervous
because they suggest jargon more than concrete initiatives aimed at improving the
quality of democracy in France’s banlieues. This has actually led to further debate over
the role of local officials in French integration politics. Thus, following the 2007 riots,
Didier Vaillant, mayor of Villiers-le-Bel, asked Sarkozy to arrange meetings to address
the ‘difficulties facing the suburbs’. These difficulties are above all geographic
segregation and social inequality, and are the focus of the next section.
Segregation and Social Inequality
Another major underlying cause of the 2005 and 2007 riots was the lack of
employment opportunities in France’s banlieues. French cities are marked by a strong
dualism of their social systems and increasing socio-spatial disparities. The case of
Lille exemplifies this. Previously an industrial region*mines, metal-working,
textiles*this metropolitan area witnessed significant deindustrialisation despite the
arrival of new industries (notably car manufacturing), and the development of new
economic activities, such as large-scale distribution centres and mail-order com-
merce. These economic shifts affected the social geography of the region because they
put an end to a mode of paternalistic management of labour which implicated the
residential proximity between entrepreneurs and their workers that lasted until the
end of the 1960s and created both social and residential segregation. In fact, owners
often met with their executives in rich ghettos surrounding golf courses (the
conglomeration of Lille has the third-biggest concentration of large fortunes in
France) whereas immigrants*along with traditional working-class families*suffered
through the economic crisis and the resulting rise in unemployment in neighbour-
hoods characterised by public housing or old, degraded workers’ homes.
In most of these suburbs or banlieues*above all spaces of poverty*observers
often use the security-based term ‘sensible’ or ‘sensitive’ in their descriptions. Though
these housing projects were often the focus of urban rehabilitation strategies in the
1980s through the implementation of public policies directed at the renovation of
these districts, the social and economic problems found in these areas were not
resolved at all. These are the places where riots have occurred over the last 25 years.
In contrast, the integrated working classes often share common spaces with
middle-class populations in big cities or their residential suburbs. Sociologists have
frequently shown in their research that social and residential segregation developed
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from a cultural homogenisation (Dubet and Lapeyronnie 1992). Except for the youth
belonging to the most well-to-do urban classes, most working-class young people,
including immigrants, attend the same schools as those of the middle classes and have
the same dress codes. A small exception must be made for the young people of the
poor suburbs of Paris, particularly those living in the Seine-Saint-Denis district, who
have dress codes that are often marked by American rap, and jargon known as verlan
or ‘back-slang’, which differentiates them from the rest of the population. None-
theless, contrary to immigrants in many other countries, most minority youth in
France do not speak the language of the country of origin of their parents, in
particular Arabic, except for some terms which they integrate into French. Due to the
social impact of the differences between these areas, one could make the case that the
urban riots of November 2005 should serve as a lesson for politicians to reduce
segregation and the phenomenon of exclusion.
In the United States, race riots were often utilised as catalysts for understanding.
During a situation similar to that found in contemporary France, democratic
administrations in the 1960s attempted to find solutions for the social exclusion that
caused widespread urban violence in US cities. For example, Liberson and Silverman
(1965) analysed 76 African-American riots that took place between 1913 and 1963.
They concluded that the principle causes of these riots were related to the socially
inferior position of African Americans in US society, including the importance of
social precariousness, marginalisation and exclusion. The authors also contended that
social institutions were not capable of responding to the needs of this population.
Thus, they argued that the government and the police were mainly responsible for the
riots.
In 1967, following a new series of African-American riots, President Lyndon
Johnson created the national committee on civic disorder. The main findings of this
committee concluded that discrimination in the job market and the accumulation of
multiple problems tied to spatial segregation and the maintenance of black ghettos*
including unemployment, drugs and crime*were to blame for the urban eruptions
that characterised the US during this period. The commission recommended
changing integration strategies aimed at the African-American population and the
Johnson administration attempted to enact these ideas. Specifically, these policies
called for the police to adopt less aggressive behaviour and change their work habits.
This period was also used to introduce more ethnic and racial minorities into police
service.
Another country which has witnessed similar outbreaks of urban violence is Great
Britain. The first, in the early 1980s, was the famous Brixton riot that was studied first
in the Scarman Report and later extensively analysed by the Home Office’s working
group in 1982. Through the impulse created by these two reports, the English police
began encouraging initiatives for ethnic recruitment. This political approach was re-
launched following the ‘ethnic’ riots in Birmingham and Bradford in 1985. Douglas
Hogg, the former Secretary of State in the Home Office, organised a conference on
police recruitment in order to launch supplementary proposals. A report on the
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impact of these Home Office measures states that, despite the above-mentioned
recommendations and programmes, minority recruitment into the police remained
low even if it has increased in specific forces (Holdaway 1991; see also Home Office
1990). The urban riots in Great Britain occurred in a context of elevated ethnic
exclusion and segregation under which the forms of police participation open to
minorities were based on the logic of competitive insertion that was ineffective.
Similarly, the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence, who was killed by five or six white
youths in Eltham, South-East London, in 1993, marked the starting-point of a major
crisis in the British police force, especially the Metropolitan Police. The conclusions
of MP Macpherson, who was charged with highlighting eventual police dysfunctions
tied to this affair, were oppressive. Macpherson (1998) proposes a definition of a
racist incident as ‘ . . . any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any
other person’ and denounced a ‘combination of professional incompetence and
institutional racism’. He followed this with a series of recommendations to address
the situation.
Unlike the cases which occurred in the United States and Great Britain, France has
not attempted to find solutions to the problems that caused the 2005 and 2007 riots.
Instead, led by Nicolas Sarkozy, French officials have attempted to benefit from the
riots by depicting its participants as professional criminals. They have also begun an
anti-immigrant campaign in order to attract the conservative electorate away from
the camp of radical right-wing politician Jean-Marie Le Pen.
Following the riots, the government enacted measures that seemed to address their
underlying causes. Social policies and animation projects aimed at reviving depressed
districts and addressing discrimination were to be re-launched and, as stated above, a
‘Marshall Plan’ for suburban areas was promised by the current government. Without
underestimating the achievements accomplished, assessment of these initiatives six
months after the 2005 disruptions seemed very thin. Associations complained that
subsidies that were promised were never paid. The mayors of suburbs also
complained that promised measures were not followed and that the social situations
in their areas remained explosive. Moreover, the Minister of Social Services had a lot
of difficulty in countering the last-minute revolt conducted by members of the right-
wing parliamentary majority who wished to renounce an article of the Solidarite´ et
Renouvellement Urbains (SRU) law.4 This article obliges wealthy municipalities
refusing to build social housing to pay a tax which is diverted to poorer cities and
towns where one finds much social housing and many poor families. The measure,
sited within the framework of the law on social cohesion, the Contrat d’insertion dans
la vie sociale (Civis), aims to provide support for troubled young people from 16 to
25 years old who do not have a degree and are coming up against obstacles that are
blocking their social and professional inclusion. By participating in this programme,
a young person commits to making the necessary efforts, with the support of the local
mission, to prepare a project of durable employment. Le Monde (29 July 2006)
indicated that several hundred young people participating in this programme in the
De´partement du Nord (of which Lille is the regional capital) saw their allowances cut
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by the state for budgetary reasons. This would seem to indicate that, six months after
the riots of November 2005, the government still had not addressed the crisis because
of the lack of important electoral stakes. Many of the inhabitants of these districts
cannot vote because they are foreigners; many others are not registered to vote, and
they abstain.
Nevertheless, analysis of the 2007 presidential elections shows that the urban riots
of 2005 had subtle effects on the electoral behaviour in these neighbourhoods. In the
case of the Parisian Region*in Yvelines and Hauts-de-Seine, the de´partements with
the highest concentration of wealthy cities in France*the centre-right candidate,
Nicolas Sarkozy, with respectively 59 and 56 per cent of the votes, did well compared
to the national average of 53 per cent. On the other hand, in the former socialist
suburbs where one finds the neighbourhoods that were most significantly touched by
the events of OctoberNovember 2005, the centre-left candidate, Se´gole`ne Royal,
achieved very good results, obtaining 68 per cent in Seine-Saint-Denis and Montreuil,
and 55 per cent in Aulnay-sous-Bois, a city where the UMP (the party of President
Sarkozy) won local elections. Most observers noted an unusually high interest in the
elections in these working-class suburbs, which witnessed higher than usual levels of
electoral mobilisation. Clichy-sous-Bois, where the 2005 urban riots began, also
noted an increase in electoral participation of more than 30 per cent, again favouring
Se´gole`ne Royal. Consequently, Sarkozy’s centre-right government has hardened its
policies in these marginalised areas, as they provide little electoral support. For
example, during the most recent violence in 2007, 1,000 police were deployed to quell
four days of rioting in the Parisian suburb of Villiers-le-Bel and the southern city of
Toulouse. Sarkozy gave his full support to the police and promised to catch the
perpetrators of what he called ‘the attempted murder of police’. While these
comments are not as inflammatory as those that exacerbated urban tensions in
2005, they still demonstrate his government’s lack of attention to the poor
relationship between the French police and the inhabitants of marginalised areas.
This was one of the most important causes of the 2005 violence and, as the events of
November 2007 demonstrate, the tension persists today, as we shall see below.
The Withdrawal of Crime Prevention and Neighbourhood Police Policies
One of the main problems in France’s poor neighbourhoods highlighted by the 2005
and 2007 riots is the poor relationship between many of the local residents and the
national police. The French model of crime prevention since the 1980s can be placed
in the ‘social prevention’ category, where programmes focus on the potential
perpetrators of antisocial acts. With the objective of intervening on the causes of
delinquency rather than on its effects, which are the focus of the situational Anglo-
American models of crime prevention, French policies during this period have
emphasised social action through work with youths living in so-called ‘sensitive’
neighbourhoods. At the end of the 1990s, the government of ex-Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin had expanded these strategies by creating assisted employment for
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youth (emplois jeunes) and by attempting to install a neighbourhood police force that
works more closely with inhabitants of marginalised districts and integrated
preventative measures.
In effect, youth unemployment was particularly high in France and closely tied to
education levels (generally higher education levels correlated with lower unemploy-
ment rates), but it had a particular characteristic which is underlined by Dominique
Duprez in his contribution to this special issue: since the 1990s, young graduates in
marginalised neighbourhoods have not followed this general trend. Stigmatised for
living in poor areas, there has been an accumulation of difficulties which have
prevented many of these young graduates from entering the labour force. Some of the
Jospin government’s proposed jobs, such as those with associations, municipal
services (libraries, mediation), the police, etc. were precarious (for a maximum of five
years) and poorly paid, but these positions permitted young people to save face and
helped them integrate economically. The questioning of the worth of these policies by
President Jacques Chirac and his conservative governments has created a lot of
resentment in the banlieues and indirectly increased the value of the illegal economy,
especially in terms of activities related to the drug trade (Duprez and Kokoreff 2000).
Sarkozy has also openly questioned the worth of creating a community police force
in France*the police in France are part of the state and their recruitment is national.
The main rule is that policemen do not work in their home regions until the end of
their careers and they are the armed wing of the central government’s power. Mayors
have no authority over the police operating within their territory. Research on police
in France has underlined the existence of tensions between them and youths in
deprived neighbourhoods. In particular, scholars have noted the prevalence of
arbitrary identity checks, especially amongst young ethnic minorities (see Mucchielli,
this issue; also Jobard and Ne´vanen 2007). Not even the neighbourhood police were
able to improve relations between young people in the banlieues and national police,
despite the presence of local youths recruited through social employment pro-
grammes. Neighbourhood officers generally patrolled districts on foot, in pairs or
threes, and small police stations were opened to welcome residents. The disappear-
ance of this experiment signifies a restoration of a purely repressive police force, the
cutting of links with local communities, and a return to a climate of confrontation,
strongly encouraged by Sarkozy. The flight from the police of three young people who
had done nothing wrong*the origin of the 2005 uprisings because it resulted in two
dramatic deaths by electrocution*is symptomatic of the climate which has since
reigned in France. International comparisons are interesting here because, in identical
conditions, Great Britain has tried to actively address reports of racist attitudes within
the police force. This has not been the case in France.
Admittedly, a left-wing government at the end of 1990s, in which Jean Paul
Cheve`nement was Minister of the Interior, had tried to introduce young people from
poor neighbourhoods into the national police on the basis of a report that migrant
youths were under-represented, despite the fact that most of this population had
attained French citizenship. Nonetheless, studies have demonstrated the limited reach
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of this policy which was quickly abandoned by the political right when it returned to
government (Duprez and Pinet 2001).
This question of the relationship between the police and the inhabitants of
immigrant districts will be evoked in several articles in this special issue. Indeed, in
most of the countries examined, urban riots have started over conflicts between
police and young people. In the French case, it is the combination of the crises of
social policies and employment assistance for young people on the one hand, and the
presence of daily (even if only symbolic) police violence on the other, which explains
the spread of the 2005 riots to about 300 municipalities during three weeks of
uprisings. Little has changed since the 2005 violence or even since the 2007 riots.
During Sarkozy’s first six months in office as president, he has focused significantly
on urban crime rather than on tensions between local youths and the police. His
most important initiative for dealing with youth crime has been punitive in nature. In
July 2007, the government passed a law that required tougher minimum sentences for
repeat offenders and, in many cases, permitted youths between the ages of 16 and 18
to be tried and sentenced as adults. Thus, suburban communities and national
authorities are drifting further apart. Policies such as these laws on youth crime
highlight more than just integration difficulties in France. They speak of serious
citizenship problems in France’s marginalised neighbourhoods. In fact, most of the
riots’ participants were not challenging French notions of citizenship but were
denouncing their lack of implementation in their neighbourhoods.
The 2005 Riots: More Republican than Anti-Republic
International observers of French politics have long discussed their conflictive nature.
Some have focused on a ‘culture of conflict’ (Tilly 1986) while others have examined
structural variables, such as the centralised nature of the French state and the nature
of political power in the political system (Hall 1986). French tendencies for rebellion
have been documented in numerous arenas, such as interest representation (social
movements), political economy (strikes), and even electoral behaviour (protest
votes). Why, then, should the political behaviour of immigrants and minorities be
identified as deviating from this tradition? Following the 2005 riots, France was hit by
violent student strikes in 2006 and massive transport strikes in 2007.
The 2005 riots*like those that preceded them on a smaller scale and the
November 2007 riots*have always been treated as challenges to the French
republican model of democracy (Bouamama 1994), which elevates the importance
of the collective good and the individual citizen and ignores communitarian
affiliation. It has often been assumed that minorities participating in the riots were
challenging this system merely because they were ethnic minorities. For example,
Canadian immigration specialists such as Jeffrey Reitz and Randall Hansen blamed
the riots on the exclusion of France’s second-generation migrants. They claimed that
such rioting is less likely in Canada due to that country’s selective immigration
system. Claude Laverdure, Canada’s ambassador to France, similarly stated in a CBC
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article on the 2007 French urban riots, ‘We seek immigrants. We go after people
around the world and welcome them . . .. France does not have such a policy. They
simply inherit immigrants’.5 Such positions of course, shift responsibility for
integration from the state to the migrants themselves. Moreover, these positions
reflect the logic of the Sarkozy government’s immigration policies based on targeted
or ‘controlled immigration’ (immigration choisie) rather than on ‘uncontrolled
immigration’ (immigration subie).
Many works have focused on the rise of similar migration control policies both in
Europe and in other advanced industrial states. Many scholars such as Hargreaves
(2007) have also written about the socio-economic exclusion and geographic
segregation that led to the 2005 urban riots in France and the 2007 aftershocks.
The link, however, needs to be made between these fields, due to the prominence of
French immigration and integration strategies in European politics. The French
presidency of the EU began in July 2008 and Sarkozy quickly put immigration reform
as one of the highest priorities on his European agenda. Sarkozy has unveiled a new
immigration and asylum pact which includes the sharing of information on legal
immigrants, the simplifying of procedures for deporting undocumented migrants,
tighter border controls and extra assistance for migration control in the EU’s Eastern
and Mediterranean border states. He also planned to institute EU-wide integration
contracts based on the French model, but this proposal was rejected by the Socialist
government of Spain.
The French riots certainly indicate the weakness of French migration policies and
the dangers that such strategies represent for the EU, should they be adopted at the
European level. While the media (and certain politicians) often framed the riots as ‘a
threat to the French Republic’, this position could hardly be further from the truth. At
no time did the rioters stake any claims to ethnic or religious rights. Moreover, the
ethnic composition of those participating in the riots varied greatly. Whereas past
riots were often portrayed as the work of youths of North African descent, the 2005
uprisings (and the 2007 riots) were clearly multi-ethnic in demographic terms. In
fact, much of the popular media focused on the increased visibility of youths of sub-
Saharan-African descent compared to the past.
Various European states are now dealing with so-called ethnic, cultural or religious
tensions. In Great Britain, political protests against the police have occurred in
Muslim neighbourhoods where the authorities have concentrated anti-terrorism
efforts and where local inhabitants claim that they are victims of discrimination. Italy
is now dealing with its first episodes of ethnic violence as well as police crackdowns
on migrants and Gypsies. In Denmark and the Netherlands, religious tensions have
escalated due to various high-profile episodes. However, the question of ethnic
tension/violence in Europe does not seem to be simply cultural, nor is it only related
to problems of social integration. These issues are above all questions of citizenship,
rights and equality. As the EU, under Sarkozy’s leadership, aims to install a system of
controlled or ‘chosen migration’ based on circular flows and temporary stays, many
critics fear that this will lead to the re-intallation of a guestworker system and
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exacerbate socio-economic exclusion. These positions are not centrally focused on
cultural issues. They deal with labour-market economics and political questions
directly related to the quality of democracy in Europe which are tangible. The 2005
riots in France highlighted this point.
These riots followed the French tradition of protest in the face of political and
socio-economic exclusion. A brief dissection of the uprisings demonstrates that there
were no cultural elements to be found during the two weeks of violence. They began,
like many others before them, as a response to perceived injustices committed by the
police, who are often viewed as intruders in poor urban neighbourhoods rather than
as public servants. Their escalation occurred because a politician, hoping to
contribute to the political capital necessary for a presidential campaign in 2007,
made indelicate statements concerning the residents of poor urban neighbourhoods.
Offended youths rallied against this message and displayed their anger at their lack of
representation in the French political system by attacking cars, buses and public
buildings. Most of the vandalism targets that were hit during the riots (except for
cars) were symbols of the French state (i.e. schools, post offices, public buses, etc.).
Finally, the rioters’ statements to the press during this period focused on socio-
economic exclusion and social discrimination, both of which are antitheses to the
values on which the French Republic has been founded.
Thus, the rioters were not challenging the French Republic, but they were
contesting the behaviour of political leaders who were acting in an ‘unrepublican’
manner themselves, as well as the failure of a socio-political system that refused the
rioters access to Republican citizenship. The 2005 riots were not significant simply
because they highlighted the failure of integration politics in France. They were
important because they clearly demonstrated the contemporary weakness of
democracy in France. In the past, French political systems had improved access to
citizenship for peasants, factory workers, women, students, etc. following periods of
social upheaval. The same alterations need to be made today for immigrants and
ethnic minorities. Otherwise France*and possibly Europe, should the EU follow the
French example*will continue to witness further Republican challenges from
migrants to an increasingly unrepublican political system. This has already occurred
in 2007.
Notes
[1] These authors, and others, participated in a debate organised by the Social Science Research
Council on the following website: http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/.
[2] This proposed employment contract would have allowed employers to dismiss employees
within two years of recruitment, without any compensation and without any obligation to
justify the dismissal.
[3] Social Science Research Council (2006) debate, online at http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/.
[4] LOI No 2000-1208 DU 13 DE´CEMBRE 2000 RELATIVE A` LA SOLIDARITE´ ET AU
RENOUVELLEMENT URBAINS. [LAW No 2000-1208 of 13 December 2000 on urban
solidarity and renewal]. According to INSEE, France had 3.5 million people living in sub-
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standard housing in 2002. In council housing the situation was no better: 22 per cent of the
inhabitants were unemployed, and many more than half had incomes below the 60 per cent
ceiling. In a bid to reverse this trend, the SRU law, adopted in 2000 by the Jospin
government, set a 20-year goal: 20 per cent of social housing for communes of more than
1,500 inhabitants in the Parisian region, and 3,500 in the provinces. Failure on the part of
communes to provide this housing would result in penalties being imposed, though these
were only small to start with. Thus the rich commune of St Maur-des-Fosse´s (Val-de-Marne)
only pays 800,000 euros per year in penalties, in spite of only making a minimal effort to
conform to the law concerning social housing (5.5 per cent only of its housing stock in
January 2005 was devoted to it compared to 5.4 per cent three years earlier). [Translation
JEMS].
[5] CBC News (2007) ‘France Riots : Understanding the Violence’. http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/paris_riots/, 28 November.
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